Nietzsche and the Falāsifa by Groff, Peter S.
Peter S. Groff
Nietzsche and the Falāsifa
Abstract: Despite the fact that very few works on Nietzsche and the Islamic tra-
dition have appeared until recently, Peter Groff contends that comparative work
on Nietzsche and philosophical traditions beyond the bounds of Europe raises
possibilities for productive cross-cultural dialogues. Toward this, he engages
Nietzsche with specific Islamic philosophers of the classical period rather than
Islam itself. Groff examines Nietzsche’s understanding of Islam and its relevance
to his critique of Christianity and European modernity. While Nietzsche had lit-
tle, if any, familiarity with the falāsifa, Groff notes their intellectual relatedness,
particularly their notions of perfectionism and philosophy as a way of life.
Orient and Occident are chalk-lines drawn before us to fool our timidity. (Nietzsche, SE 1)
In the winter of 1881, Nietzsche wrote to his friend Peter Gast, “Ask my old com-
rade Gersdorff whether he would like to go with me for one or two years to Tunis
[…] I want to live among Muslims for a good long time, especially where their
faith is strongest: in this way I expect to sharpen my judgment and my eye for
everything European.”¹ In spite of Nietzsche’s newly-established nomadic way
of life, this trip was not to be; indeed, Nietzsche never managed to venture be-
yond the bounds of Europe – at least not physically.² But the attempt to escape
the familiar and unquestioned, to wander both historically and culturally be-
yond the landscape of modern Christian European concepts and values, played
a pivotal role in his experimental philosophy. An autobiographical note from
1885 captures this strategy nicely:
 Letter to Heinrich Köselitz, 13 March 1881, KGB III/1, No. 88. For a discussion of the mood and
impulse behind the missive, see Safranski 2002, p. 219. All Nietzsche texts cited by abbreviation
of title in English. I use Walter Kaufmann’s translations for Penguin/Vintage and R. J. Holling-
dale’s translations for Cambridge University Press, with occasional emendations in favor of
greater literalness. Translations of passages from Nietzsche’s notebooks (KSA, followed by divi-
sion, volume and fragment number) and correspondence (KGB, followed by volume and letter
number) are my own.
 On this point see AOM 223, a passage in which self-knowledge eventually points towards a
kind of “universal knowledge” which Nietzsche associates with the prospect of a free-spirited,
self-determining future humanity. Cf. HH I 616 on the importance of temporal-historical wander-
ing, by imaginatively feeling one’s way into a past era.
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A great, ever greater liberation [Loslösung], an arbitrary going-into-the-foreign, an ‘es-
trangement’ [Entfremdung], a chill, a disillusionment – in those years, this alone and noth-
ing more was what I required. I tested everything to which my heart had attached itself up
to that time, I turned around the best and most beloved things and saw their back sides for
myself, I did the contrary with everything on which the human art of slandering and ma-
ligning has exercised itself. At that time I walked about among many things that until then
had remained foreign, with a curiosity that was careful and even affectionate, I learned
more easily – how to experience our time and everything ‘modern.’ (KSA 11, 40[65])³
In a subsequent note from the same period (Aug.–Sept. 1885), he gives himself
the imperative “to become step by step more extensive [umfänglicher werden],
more supra-national [übernationaler], more European, more supra-European
[übereuropäischer], more Oriental [morgenländischer] …” (KSA 11, 41[7]).⁴ This in-
tellectual wandering and expansion – towards Southern and Eastern horizons –
was at times accompanied by sickness, but ultimately pointed towards a greater
health, a freedom of the spirit, even the recuperation of a kind of nobility.⁵ It af-
forded him the pathos of distance, the luxury of looking down upon Europe from
afar and from above. In a subsequent letter to Paul Deussen, he describes this
standpoint as his “‘supra-European eye’,”⁶ elsewhere, he speaks more radically
of an “Asiatic and supra-Asiatic eye” (BGE 56)⁷ and of the need to “think more
 For an illuminating discussion of this moment in terms of Nietzsche’s “experimental philos-
ophy” see Gerhardt 1998, p. 82.
 Unless otherwise noted, the German term rendered by “Oriental” ismorgenländisch.This note,
which begins by discussing the possibility of retrieving the Dionysian experience of the Greeks,
concludes in a curious way that arguably undermines the apparent drift towards globalism: “…
finally more Greek – because the Greeks were the first major binding and synthesis of everything
Oriental – : and thus the beginning of the European soul, the discovery of our ‘new world’: – who
knows what one who lives according to such imperatives may one day encounter? Perhaps that –
a new day!”
 On the origins of this shift, see D’Iorio 2016.
 Letter to Paul Deussen, 3 January 1888, KGB III/5, No. 969. See also KSA 11, 35[9], where he
characterizes “supra-European” thinking as a preparation for becoming “masters of the earth”
(die Herren der Erde) and the “legislator of the future” (der Gesetzgeber der Zukunft).
 The perspective described here “has looked down, down into the most world-denying of all
possible ways of thinking – beyond good and evil and no longer, like the Buddha and Schopen-
hauer, under the spell of delusion and morality.” Such a vision may lead one to the “opposite
ideal” of world affirmation. For an excellent discussion of this pivotal passage, see Lampert
2004, pp. 116– 122. On the perspective that “look[s] down,” see BGE 30; despite its implied cri-
tique of Schopenhauer as exemplifying a world-denying and presumably exoteric standpoint
Nietzsche elsewhere describes him as “perhaps the best educated German, with a European ho-
rizon: there are even moments where he looks with Oriental eyes” (KSA 11, 34[150]).
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orientally [orientalischer] about philosophy and knowledge,” to attain an “Orien-
tal overview of Europe” (KSA 11, 26[317]).⁸
1 Beyond Europe: Nietzsche’s Engagement with
Eastern Traditions
Nietzsche’s curiosity with the East is well-known. The category itself evokes the
heady promise but also the excesses and shortcomings of nineteenth-century
Orientalism.⁹ Standing on the other side of the twentieth century, his evocations
of the Orient and Morgenland may at times seem outdated, clichéd, monolithic
and deceptively homogeneous, presuming as they do to encompass a diverse va-
riety of peoples and lands: Turkish, Arab, Persian, Indian, Chinese, Japanese,
and so forth.¹⁰ But Nietzsche was more sensitive than most to the irreducible
multiplicities so often masked by convenient unities, and as Thomas Brobjer
has shown, his familiarity with Eastern philosophical and religious traditions
was actually broader and in some respects deeper than is usually assumed
 Cf. Nietzsche’s half-joking self-congratulatory description of Zarathustra as “the deepest and
brightest, most southern and most Oriental book that there is” in his Letter to Marie Köckert,
Mid-Feb. 1885 (KGB III/3, No. 574). In Z IV Daughters 1, Zarathustra juxtaposes “good, clear, Ori-
ental air” (from “another blue realm of heaven, in which no clouds and no thoughts hovered”)
with “damp and cloudy heavy-hearted [schwermüthigen] old Europe.”
 The formative study of this topic is Schwab 1984 (originally published in 1950 as La Renais-
sance orientale). Said 1978 is of course the classic critique of the discipline as inextricably bound
up with Western imperialism, although it does not examine the German tradition and only
touches upon Nietzsche in passing. Influential as this groundbreaking study has been, subse-
quent scholarship on the topic has endeavored to present a more nuanced and even-handed ac-
count (see e. g. Clarke 1997 and Irwin 2006). For an excellent collection of articles on European
philosophers’ historical fascination with and indebtedness to Asian traditions, see Macfie (ed.)
2003; the volume reprints Sprung 1991 and Brobjer 1998.
 Large 2013 provides a complex, agonistic portrait of this problem. Despite the objectifying
fantasies in which Nietzsche sometimes indulges, Large argues that his Orientalism is nonethe-
less an “uncommon” one (p. 179), because his evaluation of the Orient is generally positive and
employed as a means by which to critique the failings of European culture. At the same time, it
is “contradictory” because the positive category of the “Oriental” is still defined reactively in op-
position to Europe, which retains a primacy in his hermeneutic scheme (p. 186). Yet Nietzsche
“reverses the received evaluation of the Europe-Orient distinction only in turn to deconstruct
the opposition itself, so that even while he remains within the overall framework of an Orien-
talist discourse, this discourse is necessarily qualified, and ultimately undermined, in a manner
which tempers the undeniable grossness of the stereotypes on which Nietzsche is otherwise
trading” (p. 203, cf. p. 179).
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(Brobjer 2005).¹¹ In any case, Nietzsche’s experimental engagements with unfa-
miliar ways of seeing, evaluating and living gave him the means to re-experience
his own tradition in a new light – “to sharpen [his] judgment and [his] eye for
everything European,” as he put it in the letter to Gast. It was a way of exposing
the hidden provinciality of modern European thought and questioning its most
deeply-rooted assumptions, of opening up the possibility of a less cramped and
myopic worldview – and arguably even initiating a genuinely pluralistic global
dialogue.
He has, as a result of this, become a patron saint of sorts to the field of com-
parative philosophy.¹² And his cross-cultural hermeneutic has itself given rise to
a considerable body of scholarship that might be divided roughly into three over-
lapping but nonetheless distinguishable categories: (1) studies that examine
Nietzsche’s reading, knowledge and strategic appropriation of the Asian tradi-
tions he discusses, (2) studies that examine his subsequent reception and influ-
ence on those traditions, and (3) studies that, in the spirit of his own itinerant
philosophical explorations, set him up in dialogue with select thinkers from
these traditions – thinkers who he himself never read and who themselves
had not had the chance to read him, but who retroactively have turned out to
be edifying Nietzschean interlocutors.
It was really only in the early 1990s that comparative scholarship on
Nietzsche first reached critical mass,with the publication of Graham Parkes’ pio-
neering anthology on Nietzsche and Asian Thought (Parkes 1991).¹³ Since then,
there has been a surge of studies on Nietzsche and various non-Western thinkers
and traditions. However, the emphasis so far has primarily been on India, China
and Japan, with an almost exclusive focus on Buddhist, Hindu, Daoist and Con-
fucian traditions;¹⁴ very little work has been done on Nietzsche and the Islamic
tradition.¹⁵ This is a remarkable fact, not only because of Nietzsche’s own obvi-
 For a more critical view on this question, see Sprung 1991.
 On Nietzsche’s transcultural hermeneutic and its pertinence for subsequent comparative ap-
proaches to philosophy, see Scheiffele 1991 and Figl 1991. For two useful overviews of the history
of comparative philosophy, see Clarke 1997 as well as Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie
2014. For an excellent recent methodological discussion of the comparative project, see Chakra-
barti and Weber 2016.
 The major book-length study prior to Parkes’ anthology is Mistry 1981.
 It would be beyond the scope of this discussion to attempt to catalogue the totality of com-
parative work done so far on Nietzsche. Studies of Nietzsche and various non-Western thinkers
can be found scattered throughout a wide range of journals and edited volumes on comparative
philosophy.
 See below for discussion of relevant scholarship on the Islamic tradition. To frame the point
in geographico-cultural (rather than religio-philosophical) terms, it may be argued that in con-
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ous interest in that tradition – there are well over a hundred references to Islam
and Islamic cultures strewn throughout his published works, notebooks and let-
ters – but because the prospect of establishing a cross-cultural dialogue between
Nietzsche and Islam is itself exciting and promising.
2 Nietzsche’s Islam
Some important work has already been done on this front. The main thrust of it
has focused on Nietzsche’s knowledge and understanding of Islam. Andrea Or-
succi was the first to track down many of Nietzsche’s Orientalist sources (e. g.,
William Gifford Palgrave, Julius Wellhausen, Julius Lippert, etc.) and show the
extent to which his views were influenced by them (Orsucci 1996).¹⁶ Ian Almond,
Gary Shapiro and Duncan Large have in various ways expanded upon this task,
in some cases identifying additional sources, but focusing primarily on Nietzsch-
e’s understanding of Islam and the strategic role it plays in his writings.¹⁷
A curious picture emerges when we piece together these scattered fragments.
Given Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God and his relentless polemics
against Christianity, one might expect him to be comparably unsympathetic to-
wards the last great monotheistic religion. And Nietzsche does of course have
some critical things to say, for instance, about the exploitation of the concepts
of immortality, judgment and the afterlife in Islam as a kind of metaphysical
temporary Nietzsche studies Nietzsche’s interest in the Arab, Turkish and Persian worlds has
taken a back seat to his interest in South and East Asia. On Nietzsche’s interest in Iran, see
Schwab 1984, pp. 435–437, as well as Ashouri 2010.
 Orsucci’s study does not set out to focus specifically on Islam itself, but nonetheless pro-
vides an invaluable discussion of some of the sources of Nietzsche’s knowledge of Islam (see
esp. chap. IX, 318–340). Brobjer’s otherwise excellent work unfortunately omits Nietzsche’s en-
gagement with Islam; see Brobjer 2004 and 2008. This is perhaps unsurprising though, given
that Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, etc., are typically viewed as ‘philosophies’ as much
as religions, while Islam (along with Judaism and Christianity) tends to be categorized first
and foremost (if not exclusively) as a religion. Of course, one finds important philosophical ac-
tivity within each of these religious traditions, but this tends not to be the focus of Nietzsche’s
actual remarks on Islam.
 Almond 2003 extends Said’s Foucauldian critique of Orientalism, providing useful overviews
of Nietzsche’s remarks about Islam, emphasizing the limited extent of his understanding and the
strategic ways in which he used this knowledge. Shapiro 2008 attends to Nietzsche’s sources
and understanding as well, focusing in particular on his fascination with the Ismāʿīlī assassins,
but uses such considerations as a springboard for broader reflections on the U. S.’s 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq. On Large 2013, see n. 10.
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penal institution.¹⁸ But he sees such details as peripheral corruptions inherited
from Christianity.¹⁹ On the whole, in fact, Nietzsche’s presentation of Islam is
surprisingly affirmative. I will not attempt here to document the various passag-
es from Nietzsche’s corpus celebrating the virtues, accomplishments and overall
healthiness of Islam, as this has already been done admirably.²⁰ Suffice it to say
that he sees the so-called “Lawbook of Muhammad” (das Gesetzbuch Muham-
meds) as exemplifying a “yea-saying Semitic religion,” on a par with his beloved
Lawbook of Manu (itself supposedly the paradigm of a yea-saying Aryan reli-
gion).²¹
However,we must bear in mind that at the end of the day Nietzsche’s interest
in Islam is primarily instrumental: it is first and foremost a means by which to
problematize and unsettle the complacent dogmatisms of modern Christian Eu-
rope. Ian Almond sums this up nicely by pointing out that
Nietzsche’s positive remarks concerning Islam usually fall into four related categories: Is-
lam’s ‘unenlightened’ condition with regard to women and social inequality, its perceived
‘manliness’, its non-judgmentalism and its affirmative character… In all these remarks, a
certain comparative tone is forever present, as if Islam were a kind of mirror in which
the decadent, short-sighted European might finally glimpse the true condition of his
decay. (Almond 2003, p. 46)²²
Put simply, Nietzsche is less interested in Islam as an object of understanding in
its own right than as a temporary ally in his fight against Christianity and Euro-
pean modernity, a provisional alternative perspective that can help to show the
optionality and contingency of that worldview. As the old maxim has it, “the
 See KSA 13, 14[204] and A 42. Other ostensibly critical observations about Islam, e. g., its use
of energy-monopolizing prayer rituals (GS 128) and other kinds of deception or manipulation (A
55) are acknowledged by Nietzsche as (1) common to most religions and (2) wise and necessary
policies for dealing with the vulgar multitude.
 As Orsucci points out, Nietzsche adopts this idea from Julius Wellhausen; the passages from
the Nachlass and the Antichrist mentioned above are in fact cribbed from Wellhausen 1884,
vol. 3, p. 209 f. (see Orscucci 1996, pp. 339–340). Cf. Almond, who emphasizes the way in
which Nietzsche adopts and inverts European orientalist assumptions here (i. e., that Christian-
ity is the font et origo of Islam), and in doing so implies the existence of an Ur-Islam presumably
uncorrupted by the “womanish” metaphysics of Christianity (Almond 2003, p. 53).
 For this, see Almond 2003, passim.
 KSA 13, 14[195], but cf. Brobjer 2004, pp. 17– 18.
 Almond describes Nietzsche’s Islam as “ultimately vacuous”: it first and foremost serves a
“combative, antagonistic function … but never emerges as an object of interest in itself” (Al-
mond 2003, p. 51). On this point, cf. Large 2013, p. 186.
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enemy of my enemy is my friend.”²³ This should come as no surprise, though,
given what has been said so far: Nietzsche’s hermeneutic incursions into foreign
traditions are primarily for the sake of cultivating a greater autonomy from the
unconscious constraints of his own European lineage, and thus improving his
own self-understanding and prospects for life. But then, one would hardly
turn to Nietzsche for a defense of the value of disinterested knowledge.²⁴
3 Nietzschean Dialogues with the Falāsifa
So,where do we go from here? Nietzsche scholars haven’t confined themselves to
reconstructing his knowledge of Buddhism or Hinduism or Confucianism – why
then should we content ourselves with just reconstructing Nietzsche’s under-
standing of Islam? Why not delve into Nietzsche’s reception and influence within
the Islamic tradition? And further: why not engage in the hermeneutic project of
comparative philosophy? Having mentioned the desirability of establishing a
dialogue between Nietzsche and Islam, I now need to back-peddle a bit, because
I am not sure what it would mean to cultivate a dialogue between a particular
thinker and an entire tradition – especially one as long-standing, widespread,
decentralized and heterogeneous as Islam.We can look at how Nietzsche selec-
tively understood and used Islam.We can look at how subsequent thinkers in the
Islamic tradition understood and used Nietzsche.²⁵ We can even employ Nietz-
schean optics in the interests of contemporary world-political concerns, e. g.,
to problematize post-9/11 discourses about the supposedly essential conflict be-
tween Islam and the West (Shapiro 2008), or to challenge naïve Islamist myths
about the origin and soul of Islam, in order to reconstruct a more nuanced
 Almond takes this as the sub-title of his article; interestingly, a variant of the phrase can be
traced back to Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra (c. 100 BCE–100 CE), an Indian treatise on material advant-
age, politics, economics and war. See Arthaśāstra 2012, pp. 120–122.
 In spite of his occasional celebration of “life as a means to knowledge” (GS 324, cf. Letter to
Otto Eiser, early Jan. 1880, KGB III/1, No. 3), Nietzsche rejects the pursuit of knowledge for its
own sake, just as he rejects the idealistic credo art pour l’art. The notion that knowledge is an
end in itself (and thus an absolute value) rather than ultimately answerable to life is a remnant
of the ascetic ideal, a project that Nietzsche both inherits and subverts.
 See e. g. Issami 2016 and Hanssen 2017. On the progressive translation of Nietzsche’s texts
into Arabic, Persian and Turkish see respectively, Mosbah 2006, Ashouri 2006, and Arouba 2010.
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and flexible understanding of its identity (Jackson 2007).²⁶ My own predilec-
tions, however, are somewhat different.
At the end of the day, Nietzsche conceived of himself first and foremost as a
philosopher. That was for him, as we know, a privileged and honorific title.²⁷ So it
seems to me that if one wants to cultivate a dialogue between Nietzsche and par-
ticular voices within the Islamic tradition, the most appropriate and interesting
thing to do would be to set him up in conversation with other actual philoso-
phers. And the Islamic tradition has a produced an impressive lineage of philos-
ophers: figures like al-Kindī, al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Bājja,
Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rushd and so forth. This is just the tip of the iceberg in the
so-called ‘classical’ period (9th–12th c. CE); the list goes on and on. Such figures
have typically been omitted from Eurocentric histories of philosophy in the West
or at most relegated to a footnote or short chapter, although this is thankfully
starting to change.²⁸ Nietzsche himself, unfortunately, had no familiarity with
these thinkers: he never mentions any of them, no works by or about them
can be found in his personal library or list of readings, and there’s little reason
to think that he might even have encountered their ideas indirectly.²⁹ Why then
attempt to establish a conversation with them retroactively, as it were?
First, let me say that an exclusive obsession with concrete historical trans-
mission is the death of comparative philosophy. There has to be some play
there, some flexibility, some imaginative openness; otherwise all we are left
with is philological spadework, which is of course necessary and interesting,
but no substitute for philosophy itself. Nietzsche had no familiarity with Confu-
 Jackson’s book is an ambitious, though not entirely successful attempt to reconceive the na-
ture of modern Islamic identity through the lens of Nietzsche’s thought. For an analysis of its
shortcomings, see Groff 2010.
 On this, see part six of BGE (“We Scholars”), which attempts to disentangle the notion of the
philosopher from a host of modern corruptions and recuperate its world-historical significance.
For a rich and thoughtful consideration of this question, see Lampert 2018.
 The most obvious single instance of this – apart from the recent proliferation of new trans-
lations and studies of Islamic philosophical figures, movements and traditions – is Peter Adam-
son’s groundbreaking podcast series “History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps” (https://
www.historyofphilosophy.net/), subsequently available in print form Oxford University Press
(Adamson 2016).
 See Campioni, D’Iorio, Fornari, Fronterotta, and Orsucci 2003, as well as Brobjer 2004 and
2008. If there were any Islamic philosopher he might have been familiar with, it would have
been the twelfth-century Andalusian Ibn Ṭufayl, whose philosophical tale Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān
was translated into Hebrew, Latin, Dutch, English, German, French, Spanish and Russian. The
text impressed a wide range of European philosophers and scientists – Hobbes, Spinoza,
Locke, Leibniz, Newton, Rousseau, and Kant, to name but a few – arguably serving as a vital
source for the nascent scientific revolution and Enlightenment.
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cius, or with the Chinese Daoist thinker Zhuangzi, or the Indian Madhyamika
Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, or Zen master Dōgen, but this doesn’t mean
their thoughts don’t resonate and spark in edifying ways.³⁰ It is no surprise,
then, that interesting comparative work has been done on them. I would suggest
that philosophers like al-Kindī, al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī and so forth hold out a similar
promise.What would they have to say to one another? Cross-cultural and histor-
ical conversation, like any genuine dialogue, requires a fusion of horizons,which
itself presupposes that the interlocutors’ philosophical worldviews are not her-
metically sealed off from one another.What might Nietzsche and the Islamic phi-
losophers have in common? What concerns or commitments might they share,
which could provide the thin end of the wedge in opening up a worthwhile phil-
osophical dialogue?
One obvious thing they share is a common intellectual heritage: an extensive
knowledge of, and appreciation for, the insights of classical Greek and Hellenis-
tic thought. This is particularly the case with regard to the early falāsifa.³¹
Nietzsche and the falāsifa were careful students of the ancients, the former
through his background in philology, the latter through the great Graeco-Arabic
translation project and the many commentaries that accompanied it (Gutas
1998). Moreover, their engagement with Greek thought was neither passive nor
merely a matter of historical interest; for them, it was vital and directly pertinent
to their lived experience of the world. Nietzsche and the falāsifa put the insights
of the ancients to work in bold new ways: they appropriated, transformed and
 As Brobjer notes, Nietzsche acquired copies of the Great Learning (then traditionally attrib-
uted to Confucius), and Laozi’s Daodejing, but seems not to have read either. Compared to his
interest in and knowledge of Indian philosophy (due in part to his friend, the great Indologist
Paul Deussen), Nietzsche’s familiarity with Chinese and Japanese philosophy was minimal.
See Brobjer 2004, pp. 10, 19 (n. 6) and 20 (n. 29–30).
 Falāsifa (sing: faylasūf, “philosopher”) is derived from the Arabic falsafa, a loan word drawn
from the Greek philosophia. In the classical period, it generally indicated philosophers who were
indebted to or allied themselves in some way with ancient Greek thought. A broader – and more
indigenous term – for philosophy within the Islamic tradition is ḥikma (“wisdom”), often used
side by side with falsafa during the classical period and with even greater frequency after that.
Ḥikma casts a wider epistemic net than falāsifa, encompassing not just the rational argumenta-
tion, conceptual analysis and demonstrative proofs traditionally associated with the Greek-influ-
enced philosophers, but other ostensive sources of knowledge: divine revelation and its exege-
sis, prophecy, traditions, dialectical speculative theology, authoritative esoteric teachings,
intuitive insights, mystical experience, spiritual exercises and ethical self-cultivation. Some of
these resources (esp. spiritual exercises and self-cultivation) were in fact central to the activity
of the falāsifa as well. I emphasize the falāsifa in particular here because of their explicit appro-
priation and reinterpretation of Greek thought. For a useful overview of the parameters of phi-
losophy in the Islamic tradition, see Nasr 1996a and 1996b, as well as Peters 1996.
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reanimated Greek ideas in new contexts and towards new ends that their progen-
itors would scarcely have recognized. Perhaps unsurprisingly, their reinterpreta-
tions and repurposings often diverge radically and at times even become anti-
podes of a sort.
A few areas of intersection warrant mentioning. First, Nietzsche shares with
the falāsifa an older, more traditional conception of philosophy as a ‘way of life’
(bios) or ‘art of living’ (technē tou biou). This notion, which Pierre Hadot in par-
ticular has helped to recuperate, was common to most ancient Greek and Hellen-
istic thinkers, who saw their task not simply as the discovery or construction of a
system of true propositions, but more fundamentally, the transformation of one’s
experience of the world, indeed, the shaping and cultivation of one’s self,
through various kinds of askēsis or spiritual practices (Hadot 1995 and 2002).³²
Setting Nietzsche up in dialogue with thinkers like al-Kindī or al-Rāzī or Ibn Ṭu-
fayl, we can see the various ways in which such practices might be reconceived
within new horizons, with radically different conceptions of flourishing. For the
latter, this self-sculpting activity reveals or recuperates essential structures of the
self ultimately rooted in the deeper reality of God – structures that have been ob-
scured by confused, incoherent beliefs, unruly passions, unexamined inherited
customs and inadequately reflective habitual practices. For Nietzsche, of course,
there is ultimately no essential self to return to, but one can discover to a greater
or lesser extent one’s “granite of spiritual fate” (BGE 231) produced by the con-
tingencies of natural history, and experiment with different forms of aesthetic
self-cultivation to complement or at least work around it, occasionally expand-
ing the boundaries of human perfectibility.³³
This project points towards a second theme that runs throughout the classi-
cal period of Islamic philosophy and perhaps less obviously, if no less important-
ly, through Nietzsche’s corpus: the Platonic conception of philosophy as “becom-
ing like God so far as it is possible” (homoiōsis theōi kata to dunaton).³⁴ This
takes various forms in the Islamic tradition. One might undertake the imitation
of God (tashabbuh bi allāh) by knowing the truth, cultivating or perfecting one’s
character and doing good (in this respect there is some resonance with the Sūfī
project of bringing one’s character traits into accord with those of God). Or one
might attempt to imitate God in political terms, by (1) acquiring a theoretical
 For a reading of classical Islamic philosophy along these lines, see Azadpur 2011, esp.
pp. 3– 19. On this theme in Nietzsche, see Hutter 2005, Ure 2008, Hutter and Friedland (2013),
and Ansell-Pearson 2014.
 On this, see Groff 2004 and 2014a.
 See Plato, Theaetetus 176b–c; cf. Symposium 207e–209e, Republic 500c and 501b, and Ti-
maeus 90a–d. For an excellent discussion of this ideal, see Sedley 1999.
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knowledge of God and the world, (2) constructing an ideal state as the counter-
part of the universe, and (3) imitating the actions of God by endeavoring to es-
tablish the state within it as a spatio-temporal phenomenon, taking into consid-
eration the prevailing cultural-historic conditions and constraints. One even
finds what might be characterized as a natural scientific interpretation of this
ideal, in which the philosopher imitates the Creator by acquiring the science
of generation and ultimately learns how to produce minerals, plants, animals,
and even an artificial human being.³⁵ The imitation of God may seem like an ar-
chaic irrelevancy for a thinker like Nietzsche, but I would suggest that its echoes
nonetheless resonate through his thought in fascinating ways in the wake of the
death of God – not only in his experimental notions of self-cultivation (the at-
tempt to recuperate and redeem the blind, aleatory workings of nature) but in
his ambition to shape the future of humanity (the cultivation of “higher
types” based on the various “lucky strikes” (Glücksfälle) strewn through human-
ity’s past).³⁶
This in turn points towards a third and final zone of intersection: the appro-
priation of the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-ruler (Rep. 473d). Nietzsche
shares with a number of thinkers in this tradition a commitment to the ideal co-
incidence of political power and philosophical wisdom.³⁷ It is a commonplace to
emphasize the anti-Platonic elements of Nietzsche’s thought, and certainly this
is correct as regards his overturning of metaphysics, but in terms of his political
philosophy, Nietzsche is a card-carrying Platonist.³⁸ Genuine philosophers are
for him “commanders and legislators” who create values and are uniquely re-
sponsible for shaping the future of humanity (BGE 211) – one condition for
which is the ability to think, at least temporarily, in a “supra-European” way
(KSA 11, 35[9]).³⁹ Having on various occasions drawn approving comparisons be-
tween the nomothetic ambitions of Plato and Muhammad as lawgivers,⁴⁰
Nietzsche might have been curious to discover that he had an important prede-
 On the appropriation of homoiōsis theōi in the Islamic philosophical tradition see Berman
1961 and Druart 1993, esp. 336–344.
 See Groff 2004 (p. 147), 2014a (p. 989) and 2014b.
 On the influence of Platonic political philosophy within the Islamic philosophical tradition,
see Rosenthal 1961, esp. pp. 113–223.
 On Nietzsche as Platonic political philosopher, see Strauss 1983, Picht 1988 (esp. pp. 226–
241), Lampert 1993 and 2018, Rosen 1995, McIntyre 1997, Hutter 2005 and Groff 2006.
 Cf. BGE 203, as well as Z II Stillest Hour; for illuminating early drafts of BGE 211, see KSA 11,
26[407] and KSA 11, 38[13]. Such philosophical legislators may even disseminate noble myths
and religions as tools for the cultivation of different types (see e. g. BGE 61–62).
 D 496; KSA 11, 26[407] and KSA 11, 38[13]; cf. KSA 9, 11[19]. Interestingly, Nietzsche even sees
Muhammad as part of his own “lineage” (Herkunft) (KSA 9, 15[17]).
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cessor in this respect: al-Fārābī, who first adapted, extended and transformed
Plato’s political teaching to accommodate the new realities of Islam, linking it
to the revealed religious law and the phenomenon of prophecy.⁴¹ For al-Fārābī,
the true philosopher must not only be a ruler, prince and legislator, but a spiri-
tual leader.⁴² That is, he must be capable of taking complex philosophical truths
and conveying them to the multitude through colorful images and persuasive
mythopoetic speech. This is in fact the role of religion according to him: an
‘image’ of philosophy, it nonetheless performs a certain surrogate soteriological
function, providing true belief and thus happiness to the many, according to
their hierarchical natural capacity.⁴³
This suggests a number of potential points of entry for a series of cross-cul-
tural dialogues between Nietzsche and Islamic philosophers.⁴⁴ I can of course
only gesture towards what I see as potential resonances here. For real proof,
one would need to dive into the more fine-grained nuances of their texts. Read-
ing Nietzsche’s middle period works like Daybreak or the Gay Science side by
side with al-Rāzī’s Book of the Philosophical Life, or Zarathustra alongside Ibn
Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, or Beyond Good and Evil next to al-Fārābī’s Attainment
of Happiness is both enlivening and provides a transformed understanding of
Nietzsche’s thought, while showing him to have many more at least partially kin-
dred spirits within the tradition to converse with. It also reveals the philosoph-
ical tradition out of which Nietzsche emerges to be broader and more heteroge-
neous than generally understood. If Nietzsche’s historical engagement with
Islam ultimately turned out to be something of a disappointment – more of a
monologue than a genuine dialogue – I suspect that a conversation with the falā-
sifa would turn out quite differently.⁴⁵
 On al-Fārābī’s influential reimagining of Platonic political philosophy, the definitive study is
Mahdi 2001.
 See Alfarabi 2001, §§37–64. The Platonic notion of the philosopher-king was in various ways
taken up by subsequent Islamicate philosophers in the Andalusian tradition such as Ibn Bājja,
Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd.
 For a comparison with Nietzsche, see Groff 2006.
 Other possible points of comparative examination are (1) the appropriation of Neoplatonic
apophatic strategies (the via negativa) in approaching God and nature, (2) the Platonic tension
between philosophy and the city, and (3) ‘naturalistic’ explanations of religious phenomena
(prophecy, revelation, immortality, etc.). On the first two areas of intersection, see Groff 2015
and 2016.
 My thanks go to Herman Siemens, Siham Issami, Gary Shapiro, Gabriel Zamosc-Regueros,
Michael J. McNeal, Daniel Coyle and Gary Steiner for their helpful comments, criticisms and sug-
gestions.
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